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Article 4

COMMENTARIES

The Supreme Court Stops the Presses

Lawrence R. Velvel*

The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects a
disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in
our society . .

[T]he Court in these cases holds that a news-

man has no First Amendment right to protect his sources when
called before a grand jury. The Court thus invites state and
federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the
press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of goverment.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Government has an interest in law and order; and history shows
that the trend of the rulers-the bureaucracy and the police-is to
suppress the radical and his ideas and to arrest him...
Today's decision is more than a clog upon news gathering. It is a
signal to publishers and editors that they should exercise caution in
how they use whatever information they can obtain. Without immunity they may be summoned to account for their criticism. Entrenched officers have been quick to crash their powers down upon
unfriendly commentators. ...
The intrusion of government into this domain is symptomatic of the
disease of this society. As the years pass the power of government
becomes more and more pervasive. It is a power to suffocate both
people and causes. Those in power, whatever their policies, want
only to perpetuate it.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721,
724-25 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
* B.A., 1960, J.D. 1963, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, Catholic
University of America School of Law.
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On June 29, 1972, three cases involving grand jury subpoenas issued to newsmen were decided together by the Supreme Court.' In Branzburg v. Hayes,
the newsman had written stories about the synthesizing and use of illegal
drugs. He refused to tell the grand jury the names of the informants or
other people involved in the writing of the articles. The reporter also refused to divulge any information given to him in confidence. In In re Pappas, the newsman had been allowed inside a Black Panthers headquarters
during an outburst of civil disorder. Pappas also refused to tell the grand
jury what he had seen and heard in the headquarters or the identities of
the persons he had met there. Finally, the newsman in United States v.
Caldwell had spent considerable time covering the activities of the Panthers.
He too refused to appear before the grand jury to disclose the private information he had obtained.
The reporters claimed that the first amendment guarantee of a free press
protected them from being required to appear or testify before a grand jury
unless three conditions were met: the government had to show that (1)
there was probable cause to believe that the newsman had information about
a specific probable crime; (2) the requested information could not be obtained by alternate means; and (3) there was a compelling and overriding
governmental interest in obtaining the information.
By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the newsmen's argument.
It was entirely rejected by Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion,
and by three Nixon judges-Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. In a brief
concurring opinion, Lewis Powell-the fourth Nixon justice-voted against
the newsmen but seemed to leave the door open to a different result in some
future case. Justice Douglas dissented, maintaining that reporters are completely exempt from mandatory grand jury appearance or testimony. Douglas' dissent was based largely on his absolutist conception of first amendment rights. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall found the newsmen's
three requirements to be the appropriate standard.
The Basic Policy Choices
The newsman-subpoena cases presented a clash between fundamental policies underlying the use of grand juries and fundamental policies underlying
the first amendment. The majority came down hard on the side of the former considerations. It is evident from Justice White's opinion that the majority's choice was dictated by a tremendous stress on the need to combat
crime and to use the grand jury in this effort. The function of the grand
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:324

jury, the Court asserted, is to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and who committed it. This is a
crucial task, for
[f]air and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security
for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury2 plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process.
The state was said to have a compelling interest in extirpating the drug traffic, forestalling assassination attempts, and preventing violent disorders,
which were the subjects under investigation by the grand juries in the three
cases. For the grand jury to fulfill its role as "an important instrument of
effective law enforcement," it must have broad investigative powers, which
are not limited by forecasts as to the probable result of an investigation. 8
Citizens generally are not immune from grand jury subpoenas, and the majority could see no reason for the situation to be different for newsmen.
So strong was the majority's stress on combatting crime that White's opinion went so far as to seriously distort some of the arguments made for the
other side. The majority stated that it
cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment
protects a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of
his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory 4 that it is better to
write about crime than to do something about it.
But, of course, no one was arguing that it is better to write about crime than
to do something about it. What was being argued was that the protection of
confidential sources will enable the press to discover and bring out more information about crime and chicanery and will thereby better enable the government "to do something about it." The point was that the government
should act by using methods other than issuing subpoenas to newsmen.
Another distortion was that Justice White appeared to analogize the newsmen's position to the claim that the first amendment confers a license to violate otherwise valid laws. But, as White himself admitted, no one claimed
the first amendment confers a license for crime. The sole question was
whether a newsman can be forced to reveal the source of his information as
to what the crime is and who the criminal is. No one objected to the government using other methods to detect and prosecute the criminal.
Finally, the majority opinion noted that historically the grand jury has
had two functions: ferreting out crime and protecting the citizen against
2. Id. at 690.

3. Id. at 701.
4. Id. at 692.
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unfounded prosecutions. 5 But in its zeal to promote the former function, the
majority opinion ignored the widespread belief that today the latter function
has largely atrophied. Today it is widely thought that, instead of protecting
citizens, grand juries serve mainly as tools for prosecutors. 6 One consequence is, of course, that vindictive or politically motivated prosecutors can
use the grand jury as a tool of harassment. The capacity for misuse of the
grand jury was not lost on a number of the dissenting Justices, who argued
against extending the grand jury's power by compelling the appearance and
testimony of newsmen.
While the majority strongly emphasized the need to combat crime, the dissenting Justices opted for the values protected by the first amendment. Their
basic argument was simple.7 A full and free flow of information to the public is vital to enlightened decision-making in a democracy. To enhance that
flow, newsmen must have informants from whom to obtain information and
who feel free to write about and discuss the issues. These considerations
are impaired if the government has a broad power to call newsmen before
grand juries and to question them about their sources or about the things
they have seen or heard in confidence. Many sources are unwilling to give
information to newsmen, or to permit newsmen to observe them, unless they
can be assured that confidentiality will be maintained. In short, if newsmen
can be hauled before grand juries, these sources will dry up. Moreover, if
newsmen can be forced to testify, they will feel compelled to engage in selfcensorship in order to avoid publishing matters which could lead to a mandatory appearance before a grand jury. The sum total of the effect of these
cases is that the press, which should be rooting out and exposing the existence of crime or governmental misdeeds and which should be engaged in the
competent coverage of events and movements, may instead be reduced to
publishing press releases and hand-outs that reveal only the information
which their authors wish to see revealed.
The different values chosen by the majority and the dissent-stressing the
need to combat crime versus the need for an enlightened citizenry-reflect a
strong disagreement over fundamental philosophy and priorities. Although it
cannot be proven with scientific precision, it seems that these differences in
basic value systems conditioned and determined each side's response to the
subsidiary questions presented. Reading the majority opinion, one could al5. Id. at 686-87. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. See generally L. HALL, MoDERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 788 (1969); Weisman &
Postal, The First Amendment as a Restraint on the Grand Jury Process, 10
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 671 (1972).
7. See generally 408 U.S. at 711-12.
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most believe that the Nixon Justices and Byron White had never heard of
the way in which the Pentagon Papers came to life, or the way in which
Nixon's strategy over the latest India-Pakistan conflict was discovered, or the
manner in which the tremendous cost overruns on the C-5A cargo plane
were uncovered. Apart from a brief comment that stealing documents was
not a privileged activity, the majority opinion appears oblivious to the fact
that, in recent history, information about important governmental matters
often depends on confidential sources. Nor is adequate cognizance given to
the crucial role of confidentiality in enabling the acquisition of information
on dissident political groups. Recent decisions, such as the Gravel case8 and
last year's Washington Post case, 9 indicate that, far from protecting the
methods of securing information on governmental misconduct, a number of
the majority judges have a very low regard for the release of such information. They prefer instead to concentrate on crime in the streets.
The dissenting Justices, on the other hand, are much impressed by the
lessons of recent political history. The dissenters pay heed to the necessity
for information about governmental actions and to the possibility that such
information will be curtailed by the Court's opinion. Their world view is
less concerned with crime in the streets than with a viable governmental and
political system.
I. As stated above, each side's choice of basic values appeared to dictate
its reaction to subsidiary questions. A major subsidiary question was the
extent to which newsmen actually rely on confidential sources and the extent to which such sources might dry up if reporters can be hauled before
grand juries. The evidence available to the Court on the use of confidential
sources consisted of affidavits filed by a number of newsmen and surveys
made by lawyers. These materials indicated that the use of confidential
sources can be and often is quite important in presenting the news. Of
course, not every newspaper or television station makes heavy use of information obtained in confidence. However, the overall impression one gets is
that these sources play a significant role in gathering and analyzing news.
It is true that the drying up of these sources is not empirically certain. The
results of one survey indicate that only a relatively small percentage of newsmen feel that the threat of being subpoenaed had adversely affected their
ability to obtain news, and many other newsmen felt their fears about
sources drying up had proven unjustified. Yet, as Justice Stewart indicated,
even if the percentage of sources which dry up is small, their absolute number may be large and the flow of information to the public will be substan8. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
9. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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tially impaired. Furthermore, it is apparent that, when sources demand confidentiality, it is reasonable to assume that a large number of them will be
reluctant or unwilling to give information unless they are given the necessary
assurances. Indeed, in two of the cases before the Court, explicit promises
of confidentiality were required before the reporters were permitted to observe the people and events about which the grand jury wished to inquire;
in the third case, there clearly were understandings that certain matters
would not be revealed to the newsmen unless they were kept in confidence.
Given their reliance on the values of the first amendment, the dissenters
were quite willing to accept the evidence in the affidavits and surveys that
confidentiality plays a significant role in gathering news, and to arrive at
the conclusion that many sources would dry up if newsmen could be subpoenaed. Moreover, the latter conclusion was fortified by practical considerations. As Justice Stewart said,
An officeholder may fear his superior; a member of the bureaucracy, his associates, a dissident, the scorn of majority opinion. All
may have information valuable to the public discourse, yet each
may be willing to reveal that information only in confidence to a
reporter whom he trusts, either because of excessive caution or because of a reasonable fear of reprisals or censure for unorthodox
views.' 0
In short, informants' jobs and reputations may be threatened if their names
are revealed. And if a reporter had to reveal the name of an informant who
told him about organized crime or violent crimes, the informant might lose
his life as well. These considerations underscore the belief that subpoenaeing newsmen will effectively deter a substantial number of potential informants.
Even if the subpoenaeable reporter assured the informant that he would
not reveal anything to the grand jury, this would not provide much comfort
to the source. For it is just too possible that the reporter might be broken
down before the grand jury: the possibility of a long jail sentence for contempt, the hostility of the prosecutor, the possible hostility or apathy of the
grand jurors, the badgering lawyer's questions, and the lack of rights before
the grand jury, could eventually destroy the reporter's resolve or ability to
remain silent. Thus, sources can place small faith in the good intentions of
a newsman, particularly when the informant's job, reputation, or even freedom or life are at stake.
Indeed, if newsmen can be subpoenaed, a source would have to fear adverse consequences even if he is neither guilty of criminal conduct nor in
10. 408 U.S. at 729-30.
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possession of information relating to criminal conduct by others. For grand
juries are permitted to undertake virtual fishing expeditions, and can thus be
used by vindictive Executive authorities to discover all kinds of information
which is not necessarily related to crime, but might prove useful in dealing
with opponents. Grand jury investigations are not limited to specific criminal acts, and standards of materiality and relevance are very low. As the
majority itself said,
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly
by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation ....

11

The grand jury, said Justice Stewart, is effectively "immune from judicial
supervision.' 12 It can be convened by a prosecutor "on virtually any pretext," and "with no serious law enforcement purpose," except to discover the
8
confidential sources.'
The possibility of a vindictive misuse of the grand jury will give pause even
to a potential source who is innocent of crime or knowledge of crime, and
only wishes to blow the whistle on bad policies. And one might add that the
possibilities of misuse of the grand jury do not stop with attempts to discover
the informant. As many newsmen see it, they are often called before the
grand jury when the government already has the information they could give
and their testimony is thus not needed. The reasons they are called in these
circumstances can be the fact that they are articulate, that it will save the
government some expense, that the government does not want to blow the
cover on its own informers or eavesdropping, or that the government wants
to discredit the newsmen with their sources, thereby reducing news coverage
given dissident groups and causes. Certainly the desire to curtail the
news coverage given to dissident political groups is a misuse of the grand
jury, and it is highly questionable whether the saving of expense or a desire
not to blow the cover on government sources is an adequate basis for making
a newsman reveal his sources.
There were thus many reasons for thinking that the right to subpoena
newsmen could have a seriously adverse effect on the flow of information to
the public. It cannot be said that the empirical evidence and common sense
argumentation to this effect were utterly conclusive, but utter conclusiveness
is rarely available in constitutional law, and here the evidence and argumentation were at least quite strong. They were strong enough so that Jus11. Id. at 688, citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
12. Id. at 744-45 n.34. See also Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).
13. 408 U.S. at 744-45 n.34.
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tice Stewart had a right to complain about the Court's unwillingness to accept them: "We cannot await an unequivocal-and therefore unattainableimprimatur from empirical studies."'1 4 He continued, in a footnote:
Empirical studies, after all, can only provide facts. It is the duty
of courts to give legal significance to facts; and it is the special
duty of this Court to understand the constitutional significance of
facts. We must often proceed in a state of less than perfect knowledge, either because the facts are murky or the methodology used
in obtaining the facts is open to question. It is then that we must
look to the Constitution for the values that inform our presumptions. And the importance to our society of the full flow of information to the public has buttressed this15Court's historic presumption in favor of First Amendment values.
The majority did give a number of reasons for refusing to accept the idea
that the flow of information may be harmed. Where the informant is himself the criminal, of course, the decision was essentially a straight matter of
law and order. The Court did indicate its disbelief that a large percentage of
all confidential sources were themselves criminals, but basically it stressed
the policy that crime must be punished, and if subpoenaing reporters will
help the state to catch informants who are themselves the criminals, then the
reporters should be subpoenaed.
The opinion was more detailed in discussing the situation where the informant is not himself the criminal, but has given information about crimes
committed by others. Here the majority's basic point was that the evidence
failed to show that subpoenas would cause a "significant constriction of the
flow of news to the public.' 6 Estimates of the inhibiting effect, said the
Court, are widely divergent and are only speculative opinions. The informants cannot be canvassed and surveys of reporters "must be viewed in the
light of the professional self interest of the interviewees."' 7 Even if it is
permissible to subpoena newsmen, a reporter may not in fact be called before the grand jury, or the prosecution may not insist on his testifying if he
objects. If a reporter is forced to testify, his testimony is secret and law enforcement officers are experienced in protecting informants. Indeed, there
is little to indicate that informants would feel they are in a worse position if
they had to risk placing their trust in public officials as well as reporters.
History indicates that the press can flourish even though newsmen are subject to subpoenas. Minority and dissident confidential sources will not dry
14.
15.
16.
17.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

736.
736 n.19.
693.
694.
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up, because they need the press for exposure of their views. And finally,
even
[a]ccepting the fact . . . that an undertermined number of informants not themselves implicated in crime will nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk to newsmen if they fear identification by
a reporter in an official investigation, we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime
from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over
the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.18
This, of course, is the key to the Court's view. What the majority argued,
in effect, was that subpoenas should be allowed in order to catch criminals
even if it was wrong to claim that the flow of news will not be seriously impaired. The majority's arguments that the information flow will not be constricted is not convincing. Admittedly, estimates of the inhibiting effects of
subpoenas are divergent and speculative. But, on the other hand, the facts
and arguments mentioned above make it somewhat difficult to believe that
the threat of subpoenas will not result in a significant amount of deterrence.
One can attempt to discount surveys of reporters by saying that professional
self interest enters into the answers to the surveys, but reporters are the ones
with the most intimate knowledge of the importance of confidential sources.
Just who else should be surveyed? Perhaps a reporter will not be called before a grand jury, or made to testify if he objects. But how can an informant
know this in advance? It is true that the grand jury proceedings are secret
from the public, but they are not secret from prosecutors. A prosecutor
can use them to discover the identities of persons who have told reporters
about criminal activities or questionable policies of the prosecutor's political
or governmental allies. Once their names are discovered, the informants can
be harassed or lose their jobs or end up in a concrete barrel at the bottom of
a river. When potential informants have information on the derelictions of a
government in power, or the political machine behind it, or criminals with
whom it is allied, it is a deliberate blinking of reality to think that these
sources will not feel worse off if they must risk "placing their trust" in prosecutors as well as reporters. What history teaches is open to questionmany would say the press has often been entirely too timid, and one could
plausibly take the position that more expos6s would have come to light had
there been an assured constitutional rule which guaranteed confidentiality.
Finally, it is true that many minority or dissident groups rely on press coverage to get their message across. But it is also true that others are quite
18. Id. at 695.
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wary of the press and that in the Caldwell case there was specific evidence
that a relationship of trust and confidence-bottomed on the reporter's discretion and on confidentiality-was required before the Panthers would permit serious in-depth coverage of themselves and their views.
In sum, a good deal is left to be desired by the majority's reasons for believing that news will not be constricted. And the unpersuasiveness of the
majority's reasoning adds fuel to the belief that, at bottom, those Justices did
not really care whether the flow of news would be lessened. Their overriding concern was the use of grand juries to catch criminals.
I. A second subsidiary question discussed at various places by the majority is whether it is wise to fashion a single, uniform constitutional rule
binding both the federal and state governments. The Court, of course, did
not want to do this. It felt a uniform rule would simply protect private networks of informers unaccountable to the public. The fact that the government has such a system of confidential informers did not move the majority.
The Nixon judges and Justice White argued that, while it is proper for the
government to maintain and protect a system of informers to combat crime,
this does not mean the press should be able to have relationships with informants. Rather than create a rule protecting press informants across the
country, the majority simply wanted to leave it to Congress and the state legislatures to decide whether newsmen's sources should be safeguarded.
Like so many of its other arguments, this is not persuasive. Every year
the Supreme Court lays down many national rules on issues of immense public importance, issues ranging from voting rights to criminal rights. This being the case, to refuse to create a uniform constitutional rule here rings hollow. Nor is it convincing to say that it is acceptable for the government to
have a system of paid informers to ferret out crime, but to deny that same
prerogative to the press. Finally, newsmen's sources are unlikely to receive
widespread protection from legislatures. While the problem of protecting
newsmen's sources is an old one, only seventeen state legislatures have enacted statutes which protect confidential informants. 19 This leaves 33 states
where they are not protected; and given the anti-press feeling being whipped
up in the country, the politicians' distaste for exposes which can hurt them,
and the generally poor reform record of state legislatures, one can be justifiably dubious that many of these legislatures will rush into the breach to protect confidential sources. At the federal level, a bill to protect sources has
been introduced in Congress, but this bill may not pass. If it does pass,
President Nixon will doubtlessly want to veto it, since his administration
fought so hard in court against the newsman's privilege.
19. Id. at 689 nn.27-28.
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The Matter of Precedent
The newsman-subpoena cases were matters of first impression in the Supreme Court. Never before had the high Court ruled on whether the first
amendment protects the confidentiality of newsmen's sources. Thus there
were no direct Supreme Court precedents for or against the decision. But
there were a raft of other first amendment cases which established principles
that could be applied in this context.
In support of its decision, the majority cited cases which permitted "incidental burdening of the press." 20 These cases ruled that news organizations
could be subjected to national labor acts or the antitrust laws or nondiscriminatory taxation. Yet the support these decisions offer is questionable.
First, they did not place restraints on gathering or publishing news, which is
the heart of the first amendment function of the press. Rather, they were
concerned with business practices or the monetary side of the press; often
the laws involved, as in labor or antitrust matters, were not confined to the
press but extended across the economy. The newsman-subpoena cases, on
the other hand, stuck at the news gathering function of the press, which can
be far more dangerous to the first amendment. Of course, it is possible to
imagine laws which strike so hard at the commercial or profit side of the
press that the press' ability to carry out its first amendment functions would
be severely harmed. But the Court has been careful to avoid this.
Another group of precedents used by the majority held that the press
can be punished for publishing libels or can be punished for publications
which constitute contempt of court. 2 1 These cases, said the majority, prove
that the press is "not free with impunity to publish everything and anything
it desires."'2 2 But it is doubtful that the Court's use of the libel and contempt
cases is appropriate. While these cases do imply that there are times when
the press can be punished for what it has written, the majority of the libel
and contempt cases have made such punishment very difficult to impose.
The Court created and enforced rules which give great protection to the
press. Thus, these cases hardly justify a decision which gives very little protection to the press, which is what the majority did in the newsman-subpoena
cases. Moreover, to the extent that the libel cases indicate a newsman can
be punished for what he writes, they indicate this only in circumstances
where the press has published something which violated someone's rights.
In the subpoena cases, however, the press had not violated anybody's rights;
the reporters were not being punished for such violations; and the whole is20. Id. at 682-83.
21. Id. at 683-84.
22. Id. at 683.
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sue of protecting sources from the grand jury has nothing to do with whether
a newsman can be punished if he does publish something which violates
another person's rights.
The majority also claimed that past cases and general practice show the
first amendment does not give the press any special access to information. 22
The Court, for example, has in the past approved a State Department refusal
to validate passports for travel to Cuba to gather information,2 4 and it has approved limitations on the reporting of trials. 25 And the press, said the majority, is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, Court conferences,
conferences of other official bodies, and of private bodies. Nor do newsmen
have a right to witness the scenes of crime or disaster when the public gen26
erally is excluded.
The passport decision, however, was a bad one that has been severely
criticized: it was, in effect, a sell-out to the kind of cold warriorism which
demands that liberties be curtailed. In some of the other examples given
by the Court, newsmen were excluded by the group they sought to observe
or interview, whereas, in the subpoena cases, the informants are willing to
talk and be observed. Further, one wonders why and how long newsmen
can be excluded from areas of crime or disaster, since this perpetuates government secrecy. Moreover, if newsmen can be restricted from going to
Cuba and can be kept out of areas of crime and disaster when the government wishes this, could they be kept out of other areas-like Viet Nam-if
the government does not like their reporting?
All in all, the majority's arguments here are inadequate. This society already suffers from too much secrecy and lack of information. The Court
has taken questionable precedents and used them as a basis for creating
even more secrecy and lack of information.
The majority also maintained that, even though public officials use confidential informers in criminal matters, the identities of these informers
must be revealed to a "defendant when it is critical to his case."'2 7 Does this
actually support the ultimate ruling? Only questionably. For the present
decision permits the government to acquire information even when it is not
critical to its ability to build a case, as shall be discussed later.
In total, the majority's use of precedent was not too impressive. More
persuasive were the cases cited by the dissent. These can be put into two
23. Id. at 684.
24. Zemel v. Rusk,.381 U.S. 1 (1965).

25. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
26. 408 U.S. at 684-85. See generally Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
27. 408 U.S. at 698.
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categories. First are cases where the Supreme Court has protected the
right of pamphleteers and southern members of the NAACP to have their
names remain anonymous.2 s This protection stemmed from the Court's
recognition that, because of the possibility of retribution, anonymity can be
essential to an individual's ability to exercise his first amendment rights.
Those cases would apply in the subpoena situation. And it could not validly
be argued that all the prior anonymity cases necessarily rested on a higher
degree of evidence and proof as to reprisals than existed in the subpoena
cases. It is true that, in the NAACP cases, revealing members' names
would lead to reprisals in states like Alabama and Arkansas in the late
1950's and early 1960's. But the certainty of reprisals was not at all apparent in the pamphleteer case; yet the Court gave protection to anonymity.
In the subpoena cases, there was of course much evidence and argument
that forcing newsmen to reveal sources would curtail first amendment functions. The amount of evidence and argumentation should make the anonymity cases fully applicable.
Further, in many cases involving such crucial civil rights as free speech,
voting rights, and racial equality, the Supreme Court has developed a number of doctrines designed to insure that these rights are not unjustifiably
abridged. 29 The state cannot impair rights unless it has a compelling interest.
It cannot abridge them by means of laws which are vague, since such laws
create uncertainty and discourage constitutionally protected activity. When
the state's purpose could be achieved by a narrow law, it has not been allowed to use a broad, blunderbuss law which works more harm on constitutionally protected action than is wreaked by a narrow law. When legislative
investigators who seek information have created a threat to first amendment
freedoms, the Court has demanded that the investigators first prove a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of compelling state interest. And, in employing these doctrines, the Court has not
been content with merely assuming that a compelling state interest exists, or
that a broad law was necessary to accomplish a state purpose, or that there
is a substantial nexus between the information sought and a subject of compelling state interest. Rather it has given close and detailed scrutiny to
these questions.
In his dissent, Justice Stewart sought to implement these doctrines by establishing three requirements which must be met before the government can
successfully subpoena a reporter. The government would have to (1) show
probable cause to believe that the newsman has information clearly relevant
28. Id. at 734.
29. Id. at 716-17 nn.5 & 6 (citing cases).
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to a specific probable violation of law, (2) demonstrate that the information
sought cannot be obtained by alternative means, and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information. These requirements
would insure against vague or overbroad investigations-fishing expeditions-where the prosecutor has no concrete reason to subpoena a newsman
or ask him particular questions. They would insure that there is a substantial relationship between the information sought and a subject of compelling
interest.
As opposed to Justice Stewart, the majority's opinion gave much less
faithful treatment to the doctrines developed in other cases to protect crucial
civil rights. The doctrine against actions which overbroadly impair first
amendment rights was dismissed on the ground that there was no abuse of
power in the subpoena cases: the government was not seeking to expose
people just for the sake of exposure, nor was it seeking wholesale disclosure
of names without a relationship to possible crime. Of course, even if it is
true that there was no abuse of power in the three cases-and this can be
disputed-calling reporters before a grand jury will still be a deterrent to
first amendment activities, and there could be abuses in other cases where
subpoenas will be upheld on the basis of the Court's decision here.
The notion that the government has to show a compelling state interest also
received short shrift from the majority. Its most basic point was that there is
a compelling state interest in having grand juries investigate crime in order
to safeguard persons and property. The government can thus call the reporter without showing that it is probable a crime was committed and without showing that information is unavailable from other sources. Rather than
have the government show this, the grand jury will decide on these questions.
And as for showing a substantial relationship between the information sought
and a subject of compelling state interest, it was enough for the majority
that the state has an interest in stopping crime and that these reporters could
likely supply information on crime.
Mediating Principles
It has been maintained throughout this article that the newsman-subpoena
cases involved a conflict between values underlying the use of grand juries
and those underlying the first amendment. The only judge who opted
wholly for one side or the other was Justice Douglas. With his strong belief
in the efficacy of the first amendment, Douglas could see no circumstances
under which a newsman could be called before the grand jury to testify.
The majority-the Nixon four plus White--opted heavily for using grand
juries to fight crime with some small protection for first amendment rights.
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It indicated that investigations that were not in good faith might not be protected, saying that "[o]fficial harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his
news sources would have no justification." 80
Of course the majority's disclaimer as to bad faith harassment may not
provide newsmen with much protection. It will give them no protection
when the prosecutor is not acting in bad faith. And it may not even protect
them when he is. For the majority said that newsmen can be called even
when the prosecutor does not have probable cause to believe they know
about a specific crime, that a grand jury investigation can be triggered by
mere tips and rumors, and that the grand jury is a grant inquest whose investigations are not to be limited by questions of propriety or predictions of
results. The latitude that this allows the prosecutor is so broad that it is
easily subject to abuse.
It seems that the most serious attempt to develop a set of principles
which mediate fairly between the needs of the first amendment and the
need to fight crime was made by Justice Stewart. His three requirements,
outlined above, gave much protection to the first amendment. These conditions would prevent fishing expeditions, vague investigations, disturbing of
confidential relationships when the information could be had in other ways
or when the government is not seeking to protect a vital concern. On the
other hand, Stewart's requirements would permit a reporter to be subpoenaed
when this is necessary for the full implementation of an important criminal
investigation. The government, it is true, would have to show that the reporter probably knows something about the criminal acts involved, but it
will usually be able to do this. After all, if it is acting in good faith, it probably
has reason for thinking that the newsman has information.
This is not to say, however, that there are no problems with Stewart's
analysis. For instance, he does not give absolute protection to the first
amendment. Justice Douglas argued that:
Sooner or later any test which provides less than blanket protection
to belief or associations will be twisted and relaxed so as to provide
virtually no protection. .

.

. A compelling interest test may prove

as pliable as did the clear and present danger test. Perceptions of
the worth of state objectives will change with the composition of the
Court and with the intensity of the politics of the times.8'
While Douglas' point concerning pliable tests is well taken, this cannot be
escaped by invoking an absolutist test. For when the times or the judges
30. Id. at 707-08.
31. Id. at 720.
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change, any absolute first amendment rule will be watered down or narrowed
by the new Justices.
Another problem with Stewart's views from an absolutist standpoint is
that, unless a newsman receives blanket protection against appearing or testifying before the grand jury, neither he nor his source will be able to ascertain
in advance whether the newsman will be made to testify. This lack of certainty can discourage the source from imparting information and the newsman from writing what he knows. While there is force to this argument,
there can be times when the need for a newsman's testimony is overwhelming. Imagine, for example, that after a series of bombings or attempted assassinations, the police reasonably believe that these acts will again be perpetrated by the same people in the near future, and that a newsman is the
only available person with information on the culprits.
Since there can be situations where there is an overwhelming need to
have a reporter testify, it may be worthwhile to take some risk that the absence of an absolute privilege will sometimes deter newsmen or their sources.
The risk of deterrence, moreover, would be cut down under Stewart's preconditions if the latter were interpreted very strictly so as to deprive the
newsmen of protection only in extraordinary situations.
There are other difficulties with Stewart's proposals. Under his requirements, courts will have to make judgments about the existence of probable
cause to believe that a newsman has information about a crime, about whether government can obtain information elsewhere, and about whether the
government's interest is compelling. This apparently upset the majority,
but, it would appear, without good reason. Courts make judgments every
day about probable cause, alternative avenues for the government, and compelling state interests. As Stewart said, "Better such judgments, however
difficult, than the simplistic and stultifying absolutism adopted by the Court
in denying any force to the First Amendment in these cases."' 32
Finally, under any view which permits newsmen to invoke first amendment
protection, it will be necessary to determine whether such protection should
be allowed to pamphleteers, scholars, pollsters, novelists and others who use
confidential sources as an instrument for obtaining information for publication. The majority clearly did not wish to decide these questions. But
again, every day courts make decisions as to what groups fall under the protection of legal principles, and there is no reason today that such judgments
should not be made in this context. Moreover, just as the first amendment
should protect newsmen's sources, it should also protect the sources of other
32. Id. at 746.
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persons and groups whose goal is to obtain information with which to enrich
the public dialogue.
In addition to those who joined in the Stewart opinion, Justice Powell felt
it necessary to mediate between the values underlying the grand jury and
those underlying the first amendment. Powell voted with the majority and
joined in its opinion. Yet, in a brief concurring opinion, which Stewart
called "enigmatic" and thought held some hope for the future, Powell illustrated that the majority opinion did not suit him entirely. The only situation
where the majority indicated that it would protect a newsman's first amendment rights was where the prosecution was acting in bad faith. But Powell
indicated that he would go further than this: he argued that a reporter should
also be protected if the information sought from him
bear[s] only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement. .... as
He asserted that a proper balance could be struck on a case-by-case basis-a
balance between freedom of the press and the citizen's obligation to give evidence about crime.
But, while Powell went further than the majority, he disagreed with Stewart's dissent. He took exception to the fact that, under Stewart's opinion,
a reporter could only be required to appear in the grand jury room if the
three conditions were met. He maintained that Stewart's conditions imposed an onerous burden on the state and that they defeated a fair balancing
of the competing interests and harmed society's fight against crime.
Stewart is, to some extent, correct in characterizing Powell's decision as
enigmatic. For his opinion is inexplicit as to the precise procedural situation
in which he would protect first amendment rights. What Powell seems to be
driving at is that a newsman must at least appear in the grand jury room.
Since there is no point in requiring his presence unless he can be asked
questions, Powell must implicitly be saying that questions can be posed.
However, since Powell indicated that certain kinds of information need not
be divulged, he must also be implying that, once asked questions, the newsman can object to giving the information.
Nevertheless, even if a newsman objects at this point, Powell's standards
still do not confer adequate protection. While the newsman would be protected against prosecutorial bad faith, this is an extremely difficult charge to
prove. While Powell would protect against remote questions, there are many
irrelevant and coercive inquiries that the prosecutor can make which are not
33. Id. at 710.
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remote from the subject of the investigation, but which are objectionable to
the first amendment rights of the newsman. For all his talk of a proper
balance, it appears that Justice Powell comes down fairly heavily on the
side of fighting crime. Justice Stewart may well be making a mistake if he
hopes that Justice Powell will provide the additional vote which the dissenters
need to prevail in future subpoena cases.
Justice Rehnquist's Participation
Without sufficient justification either in policy or precedent, the majority
opinion decided against extending first amendment protection to newsmen's
sources. Wrong though it may have been, the majority opinion stands as
the judgment of the Court. If one of the five majority judges had not participated, there would have been a tie in the Supreme Court and the decision
in the court below would have continued in operation. In the Caldwell case,
this would have benefitted the newsmen, who won below, but it would have
been disadvantageous to the newsmen in the Pappas and Branzburg cases,
where the reporters lost in the court below. As far as the Supreme Court
was concerned, however, the question of a newsman's privilege would have
been left for resolution in a later case. How the Court would ultimately
have decided the issue cannot be known, since there always exists the possibility that a change in thinking, politics, or judges will occur. But it certainly could not have ruled more strongly against newsmen than did the
five-man majority of June 29, 1972.
All this is by way of introducing this author's belief that the vote in the
Supreme Court should have been a 4-4 tie instead of a 5-4 decision against
the newsman. One of the majority, Justice William Rehnquist, should not
have participated in the case.
It is a matter of common sense, backed up by canons of ethics and statutes,
that a judge should not participate in a case where his nonjudicial activities
or associations lead to serious doubt that he can be impartial. This is true
when the activities and associations occurred a long time ago and it is even
more true when they occurred in the recent past. Rehnquist's recent activities and associations with the Department of Justice, which was the prosecuting agency and wrote the government's brief in the Caldwell case, lead to
great doubt that he could be impartial. For as a lawyer with the Department, he was closely connected with the government's side of the problem.
When the Nixon administration began subpoenaing reporters several
years ago, a controversy arose because of the fear that this would severely
harm first amendment rights. Lawyers for the Department of Justice responded by writing a set of so-called Attorney General's Guidelines which
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detailed the circumstances under which reporters should and should not be
subpoenaed. The Guidelines went through several drafts and revisions before
being publicly promulgated. After being made public in August and September of 1970, they were later discussed at a conference on media problems. These Guidelines were quoted at some length in a footnote in the majority's opinion in the subpoena cases.
As head of the Office of Legal Counsel-as the man whom Nixon called
his lawyer's lawyer-Rehnquist was in a high level position in the Department of Justice and had a hand in formulating many important policies.
One of these policies was the Department's policy on subpoenaing newsmen.
Both the Office of Legal Counsel, and Rehnquist personally, participated in
the drawing up of the Attorney General's Guidelines. Later, at the conference on media problems, Rehnquist represented the Department's position.
In light of his work on drawing up the Department's position on subpoenaing reporters, and his representation of this position in public, Rehnquist should not have participated in any case where the Department was
fighting for the right to subpoena newsmen. Thus, he should not have participated in the Caldwell case. Moreover, his recent association as a lawyer
with one side of the controversy meant that Rehnquist also should have excused himself from participating in cases where it was not the Department,
but state prosecuting authorities, which were fighting to subpoena reporters.
He should have excused himself from state cases even if they were being decided apart from a federal case. And he certainly should have excused himself where, as actually occurred, they were decided in one opinion with a
federal case involving the Department of Justice.
Since Rehnquist should not have particpated in the newsmen-subpoena
cases, it is interesting to note that his participation in other cases decided in
late June has now been challenged by the losing parties-who, as with the
newsman cases, lost by a 5-4 vote, with Rehnquist contributing one of the
majority votes. In the army surveillance case decided on June 26, 4 and the
case of Senator Gravel, decided on June 29,85 petitions for rehearing have
been filed with the Court and Rehnquist has been asked to disqualify himself. Those who are familiar with the problem generally believe that the case
for disqualification is even stronger in the surveillance and the Gravel matters than in the newsman cases. But even so, there is little if any doubt that
Rehnquist should have disqualified himself in the newsman cases too.
34.
35.
Justice
cases.

408 U.S. at 707 n.41. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
Subsequent to this writing,
Rehnquist refused to disqualify himself in the army surveillance and Gravel
See 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972).
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Conclusion
In the final analysis, the decision in the newsman-subpoena cases represents
a needless sacrifice of first amendment rights. After reviewing the reasons
for and against the decision, one tends to agree with the comments made by
Justices Stewart and Douglas quoted at the beginning of this article. The
majority has shown itself insensitive to the critical role of an independent
press. It has created a situation in which newsmen and their sources will
have to be very cautious. It has given government another tool with which
to harass dissenters or unfriendly commentators. It has increased the pervasiveness of government power and the government's ability to stifle people
and causes.

